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CONTRACT AS THING
Arthur Allen Lefi*
In a large proportion of consumer transactions, paper passes between
the parties. The content and coverage of this paper varies widely, from
a mere identification of goods and price all the way to the highly
detailed retail installment sales contract. Many of these pieces of paper
say extremely important things, especially about goods quality, and the
parties' duties and remedies.2 It is that paper which will be the subject
of this paper.
My aim, however, while hardly uhpretentious, is quite constricted.
Granted that the present legal response to these papers is a mess, I do
not aim to suggest any solutions. I intend instead to try to show how
that current mess is rooted in our current way of thinking about these
"contracts," and to propose a new way of thinking, a new metaphoric
frameworkfor thinking, about consumer-transaction "contracts."
* Associate Professor Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1956, Amherst College. LL.B. 1959,
Harvard University.
I. Though certainly not in all. By at least one criterion, gross number of individual
transactions, the most prevalent consumer deal in the paperless over-the-counter or off-the-shelf
cash sale. But paper-accompanied transactions are certainly a material part of the consumer-
purchasing market, especially if one includes sales-slip transactions.
2. Actual surveys of the -typical" content of these forms, with analysis of what kinds of
clauses are to be found, are rare. I have in my possession a study completed in May, 1969, of
the fifty responses received to 200 form solicitations made more or less randomly to 200
merchants in three cities. This paper, prepared by John Sibley, of the Yale Law School class of
1969, includes such an analysis and tabulation, and I would be glad to send a copy to anyone
who wants it.
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('lassi/icaiion and Metaphor
To get to that new mind set (and explain the critical significance of
those quotation marks in the last sentence) it will be necessary to
describe how we got to where we now are. And to get that far along,
we will first have to make an excursion into the arid country of legal
classification, a trip which may turn out, like a fourteen-day tour of
Europe, simultaneously superficial and tedious. The point of
embarkation is a question: why would one (even within the ramparts
of quotation marks) characterize those pieces of paper which pass
between those parties as "contracts"?
To call a thing a contract is to make a legal classification. It is to
carry out that most basic step in what is sometimes called legal
reasoning (and what is confused, often, with legal logic)? It is to make
a move in the -nind game which, to coarsen a lot of distinctions, goes
something like this: given that I cannot efficiently treat this thing as
sui generis, with what other thing or group of things can I best
associate it for less-than-individual treatment.
As the crudity and non-specificity of that statement should certainly
signal, classification, legal or not, is a sticky business. As G.E. Moore
once put it, "Everything is what it is, and not another thing."' In other
words, you cannot make classes the easy way, by putting together
identical things. There are no identical things. Identity (that darling of
logicians) is solely an intellectual construct: an identical thing is a thing
which would be another thing except that it isn't. All that is perfectly
clear. All that, in fact, is pretty trivial.
What is not always as clear, or as practically trivial, is the effect that
this unreality of identity has on the classes the process creates. What
it means, in effect, is that there is no such thing as a thoroughly
homogenous class. To say that X is a member of the species Y is just
to say that there is a way of looking at and talking about X which
emphasizes its Y-ishness. There is, to use a currently modish phrase, a
"family resemblance" between X and the items already "in" Y.' It
does not mean that X is identical with any particular member of this
class Y, because Y, is not identical with Y, or Y:. or any of the
individual members of the class Y either. All classification decisions
3. See O.C. JENSEN. THE NATURE OF LEGAL ARGU\IENT 9-16 (1957) for a notable discussion
of these processes, much more illuminating than my truncated version.
4. G.L. MOORE. PRINCIPIA ETHICA (Ist paperback ed. 1960). The remark appears on the page
facing the title page. and is attributed to Bishop Butler.
5. See L \\ITTGI ,STI IN. P1111.SOPIIICAL [NVI.STIGATIONS. ' ' 65-67 (G. Anseombe Hlans.
1967).
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are, as far as the total class is concerned, choices among metaphors.
Xis like Y,Y 2 ,Y 3 . . .YnthewayY, is likeY 2 ,Y3 ,Y 4 . . -Yn-.
Even if, therefore, there is a common element of likeness, a discernible
family resemblance upon which a classification decision may usefully
be made, not even these happy families are all alike. The minute you
shift your attention from the common element upon which your
classification is based to some other, previously ignored, your
classification explodes. Or at least it ought to.
It is, of course, exceedingly rare, especially in legal classification,
most especially when the classification is at the level of generality that
the "contract" -"not contract" decision represents, to classify by
only one resemblance. But there is a very sharp limitation upon the
number of classificatory criteria one can formally use. Let us say you
are classifying bugs. Your criterion for classifying is to count legs;
more than six legs to one pile, six or fewer to another. At that point
you will have just two classes. If you add to the process another
criterion, say blackness versus color, you will produce four classes, (1)
black-6 or less; (2) black-more than 6; (3) not-black-6 or less; (4)
not-black-more than 6. Choosing three criteria will create eight sub-
classes,7 four will make 16, five will produce 32 and ten will get you
1024. To put things briefly, things can pretty quickly get out of hand
when great refinement of classification is attempted. Thus in practical
reason it would be common to classify phenomena into relatively crude
categories, that is, group them on the" basis of relatively few family
resemblances
What follows from this is that most classificatory families have very
many features that vary from member to member. One may get the
nose and ears right, and maybe eye shape and brow height too, but
cheekbones .will point every which way, and teeth will snaggle
randomly. Much of the time this makes no difference. Very crude
discriminations are quite sufficient for equally crude purposes; -if you
have a spider collection and an insect collection, and you want to
separate the day's catch temporarily, just counting legs will do nicely."°
6. But not necessarily in any other way. One who has said of his mistress "Red as a rose is
she," need not be on the lookout for thorns, or remember to mulch and water her frequently
(except, perhaps, pursuant to another set of metaphors).
7. ABC, ABC, ABC, ABC ABC, ABC, ABC ABC.
8. The formula is a pretty simple one: classifying subjects with respect to n criteria in mutually
exclusive and exhaustive pairs will yield 2n classes.
9. I must add here, without getting into any hassle about how the mind "actually works," that
people regularly assign subjects to classes much faster than I or they can describe how they do
it.
10. And if you're looking to pick up Fanny Schwartz' unmet son Morris at the airport, eyes,
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. But do for what? Why all this bother? Why classify at all? To
promote intellectual and operational efficiency." Picture a pile of
lumps brought up from a coal mine. How does one separate them into
piles? Well, if you're interested in heat, you separate the coal (i.e., that
which will burn) from the rocks (which won't). If you're interested in
fitness for different types of furnaces, you screen the lumps for size. If
the combustion end-product is critical for your purposes, you might
grade the coal lumps by sulphur content. If you were planning a fancy
photograph, you might arrange piles by color and shape. And if you
were just getting together some ship ballast, you most likely would
treat all the lumps as "the same". Assuming that no two things are
identical, some things are (by some particular set of criteria) like other
things. On the further assumption that like things should be treated in
like manner, 2 identifying likeness makes possible the generation of
rules, i.e., statements about behavior (intellectual or practical) with
respect to more-than-one-member sets. Once there is-stated, perceived
or felt-a purposive aim and a classificatory criterion (or more)
associatable with it (empirical causation being one of the most
common associations used), classification becomes "'useful" to that
end.
Now this process, while seemingly simple (especially when grossly
simplified examples are used to illustrate it), if frequently so complex
as to be, finally, almost a mystery. Neither purposes nor raw material
are so often so simple; think of all the people or even all the women,
you have known. But the great power of the classificatory process lies
in the fact that identification criteria for class membership are
frequently different from, and easier to use than, the purposive aim
which the classification was formed to serve. In the coal example, for
instance, the purposive criterion might be burnability, but the
recognition criteria would initially (and sufficiently for most purposes)
be grossly sensory. Briefly, one knows what coal looks like and also
that coal burns; hence to find out if that lump will burn one has only
to look at it, not to light it.
ears, nose and hair style will most likely be plenty. In fact, nose alone might be enough. depending
on the nose and the airport. (J. L. WITTGINSTI-Is.supra note 5. at 1 71.
11. Actually, this utilitarian answer is at most only part of the story. I suspect that people
classify for the same reason that tigers hunt and most animals copulate, which is not solely to
have food and children, respectively. It is a terrible mistake, in assessing the powers of ends. to
overlook the aesthetics of getting there.
12. On the operational level, that assumption may be empirically tested: if like treatment is
given to A and to B. and such treatment eventuates in result X for both A and B, then A is (in
that sense) like B. In other words, a "correct" classification has been made. But the "should"
in the text should not be taken as an ethical "ought." As such it is just an assumption, and an
unsupportable one at that.
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Moreover, there is often an additional bonus paid by grouping
individuals into classes. This segregation (physical or conceptual)
frequently results in the perception for the first time of similarities, the
classifying efficiency of which is greater even than the original
recognition criteria upon which the class initially was based. Go back
to the lumps of coal. Let us say that the aim of their classification was
to separate high-sulphur from low-sulphur coal. Let us assume further
that there is a chemical reagent which, when rubbed on the surface of
any lump, will fizz in the presence of sulphur. The test is expensive,
but the results are accurate. So you rub, listen, separate, and end up
with two piles. Having done so, you notice that the high-sulphur pile
is much lighter in color than the low-sulphur one. Now after
sufficiently testing to eliminate accident, you may well find you have
come up with a new, previously unsuspected association for future
classifications, this time between coal color and sulphur oxide
pollutants which, moreover, lends itself to more efficient classification
technique (e.g., by automated colorimeter scanning) than the reagent-
fizz criterion. The classification itself has generated another (and
"better") classifying criterion. And it has eliminated any need to use
the original (reagent-fizz) criterion. In other words, it is frequently the
case that one will discover, without necessarily knowing or
understanding the associative mechanism involved, that objects with
one thing in common have other things in common too, and that these
other things are more practically useful identifying criteria than the
ones first used.'
Thus, classification is a powerful intellectual device for efficiently
identifying nonidentical things and concepts which may for certain
purposes be treated identically. And like most such intellectual devices,
it is powerfully dangerous too. First, the connection between
identification criteria and the desired end of the classification may just
be wrong. After all, that connection is ordinarily just an empirical one
which means (with respect to classes) a statistical one, and empirical
observations and statistical generalizations do frequently turn out to be
wrong. This applies, of course, both to the initially chosen
identification criteria and to the new internal correlations which
become apparent among members of a class after classification.
Second, even if one's empirical observations are more or less correct,
the correlation between identification criterion and end may be less
13. A model of the mechanism which generates this statistical correlation helps, of course, to
validate its accuracy. Knowing what moves around what and from which direction does enhance
one's certainty of where the sun tomorrow will "rise".
1970]
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precise than others which have been or could be used. In our coal
example, color may indeed identify threshold sulphur content with 90%
accuracy; the reagent-fizz technique may have a 99% rate.
Third, and closely allied to the correlation slippage, is the problem
of artificial class homogenization. Now note that this homogenization
is one of the principal purposes of classification as an intellectual
device. One is trying to ignore differences. Nonetheless, there does
seem to be a tendency, once the identification is made, to ignore
differences even after they become relevant to one's purposes. This is
indeed "just" a sloppy classifying job, but a very tempting slip. Once
one identifies and, more important, names a class member by that
membership, it is easy to treat the individual member not as a member
which belongs to a class, but as a sort of composite average of all the
members of that class, i.e., as a non-individual for all purposes. If, for
instance, one exempts "automobiles" from execution (on the ground
that it is good policy to allow debtors to retain transportation), one
might also exempt a rare antique non-functional automobile. Having
used a structural and visual identification criterion roughly to identify
a kinetic purpose, it is easy to lose sight of the purpose.14
Last is the discernible fact that some identification criteria, even
though not sole criteria for that particular classification, tend to
overwhelm others in determining inclusion or exclusion. In other
words, the purposes to be served by particular classification A may
'correlate very well with the confluence of identification criteria x, y and
z. And indeed there may be some correlation between x, y and z too,
that is, if x, or y or z is present, the other two are more likely than
not also to be present. But the correlation between the purpose of class
A and x or y or z singly may be much lower, perhaps approaching
randomness, and certainly lower than the correlation between the
purpose of class A and x, y and z together. This situation is pregnant
with the threat of intellectual abortion. For it seems to me that when
purposive classification is based on the confluence of many
identification criteria, there is a tendency to rely on less than all of
them to make classification decisions, even though one's feeling of
safety (i.e., sense of correlation exactness) is based only on all of them
together. Moreover, a single identifying criterion relied upon when less
than all are is not necessarily that which singly correlates most highly
with the aim of the classification.
14. Of course, that might still be an administratively rational decision, like letting a few lumps
of high sulphur coal slip by if the alternative and more accurate test would double coal prices.
The point here is not that all slippages like this are errors, but only that some are.
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I will not, of course, be able to prove these tendencies; they are, after
all, just empirical generalizations (this time about thinking patterns)
and demand empirical evidence which I frankly do not have. But I will
offer at least one rough-hewn pile of evidence for them: a history of
the classification of the paper passing between the parties to a
consumer transaction, the consumer-deal "contract".
Contract as Contract
What belongs to the class "contract"? The "official" definition
gives some clue of the difficulty of that question by answering it with
breathtaking circularity . A contract is "a promise or set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy . . . ."15 In fact, asked
generally that way, the question defies less begging answers. A lot of
things are contracts, or at least a lot of them have from time to time
and presently ended up being somewhat subject to contract principles.
But like all classifications, "contract" has a purposive element. It is,
as always, extremely doubtful that one can come up with a purpose,
but a tight cluster is not too much to hope for. To follow Professor
Kessler's lead in this (and to implode his admirable and already
admirably tight summary) the common law's category "contract" was
developed as a method of segregating, for a particular and predictable
treatment, contemplated trading transactions between free-willed
persons in an assumedly free enterprise, free market economic system.'6
Given this relatively shadowy "aim," there arose a few class-
identifying criteria which, when present in sufficient confluence, made
things look more contracty than not.
These identifying criteria are, of course, in the form of gross
distinctions between alternative possibilities." First of all, contracts
seem to be some species of interpersonal behavior (as opposed to
person-thing interactions). 8 Second, the interpersonal behavior
15. RI.STATEMI:ENT OF CONTRACTS § I (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I
(Tent. Draft No. . 1964).
16. See Kessler. Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts ,4boui Freedom of Contract, 43
COLutI. L. Rtv. 629-31 (1943).
17. These may be set up as A-A distinctions, but in fact each of them is a softer-edged
subtraction than that, much closer, in fact, to A,. A_. A3 . . . A . AzA , than to A--4 in almost
any real-world instance.
18. But note the possibility of implying an actual promise out of certain activities toward non-
persons, for instance, by accepting goods knowing they are not gifts. See the exemplary cases Day
v. Caton. 119 Mass. 513 (1876), Austin v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286. 137 S.W. 618 (1911). and
Louisville Tin & Stove Co. v. Lay, 251 Ky. 584, 65 S.W.2d 1002 (1933) collected in L. FtuLLER
& R. BRAUCHER. BASIC CONTRACT LAW 365-68 (1964).
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demanded for a contract seems to be more or less communicative"0
(rather than directly effective, like a punch in the mouth).,0 Moreover,
the communication, to look contracty, ought to have a lot of future
tense in it, and bear somewhat on the speakers' expected role in that
future."' Next, bargain and trade seems to smell more of contract than
beneficence; there is the continual pressure to separate deals from
gifts. 22 Next is the limitedness of contract. There seems to be something
significant to contract in the bordered relationship. "the deal," as
opposed to more long-term, non-limit-bound interpersonal relationship
like husband-wife and father-son. 3 Last (and keep a close and critical
eye on this move, for it will become very important to the argument
anon), closely allied to the trade-bargain idea, is the process aura of
contract. Contract seems to presuppose not only a deal, but dealing.
It is the product of a joint creative effort. At least classically, the idea
seems to have been that the parties combine their impulses and desires
into a resulting product which is a harmonization of their initial
positions.24 What results is neither's will; it is somehow a combination
of their desires, the product of an ad hoc vector diagram the resulting
arrow of which is "the contract"
2 5
And, naturally, there is one more identifying criterion of "contract"
which cannot safely be overlooked. The criteria heretofore mentioned
had to do with contract as a process. But that process frequently results
in a refined product, a contract, a piece of paper with words on it.
Everyone knows that not every "contract" is a writing, but some are,
and for classification purposes seeing a writing is certainly one factor
in pushing the decision to rather than fro.
Now notice, I have picked out only a few identification criteria for
the category "contract." I would certainly defend the proposition that
the written product of a process of communication between persons
about future activities of at least one of them in exchange for
19. But consider the whole objective-subjective contract controversy See I A. CoRBIN.
CONTRACTS § 9 (1963).
20. Which, of course, like all "action," is at least partly communicative too. One can picture
innumerable situations in which that would mean, among other things, "I reject your ofrer".
2 1. That is perhaps the only clear message from the Restatements. See note 15, suipra.
22. See I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 4 (1963). See also § 131 for the indifferent results of
attempting this separation by consideration doctrine.
23. I am trying, of course, to keep from falling off the brink into the status-contract swamp.
but that I am in fact hanging over it by my fingernails ought to be mentioned.
24. For this aspect blown up to the very limit of pretentious expression, see G. IIGELL.
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 57-58 ( 72-75) (T. Knox trans. 1942).
25. Trading (I'll give ... if you'll give .... ; I'll give up . ..if you'll give up . . . .) is
one of these harmonizing methods.
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something from the other would be more likely to be classified as
"contract" than the result of negating all those factors. I would also
defend the proposition that while none of these factors is necessary to
such a classification, all of them, as shadowy as they are, are
important.26 I would not for a moment contend, however, that I have
isolated all or the relevant classifying criteria (that is, that even all my
criteria together are necessarily sufficient), or that I have most
effectively described the ones I have sensed and stated. Nonetheless, it
seems to me that one could predict the legal classification of certain
transactions quite precisely with reference to these relatively few criteria
and not nearly so well by ignoring any of them.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the classification
"contract" has stayed forever static, with one set of identification
criteria, or that transactions bearing the then relevant hallmarks have
never escaped. Whatever the purpose of the particular classification
"contract", the purpose of classification itself is to promote
intellectual and practical efficiency. It has frequently happened that
certain kinds of happenings have begun to resemble each other so much
more than they resembled the "average" contract that they have split
off for special treatment much more suited to the solution of their own,
narrower group of recurrent problems.2 1 Certainly that happened to
labor contracts28 and insurance contracts,29 and, most pertinently, to
sales transactions. 0 What seems to have happened again and again is
that some transaction typ&' moved too far over the end of the scale 
2
26. I find it particularly striking that it is with respect to these particular A,. A. A: ....
A,. A... 1. distinctions, between past and future, gift and trade, creating and created, status
and deal, for instance, that so many contractdlaw problems fall. Most of the grand conflicts in
the field, mutual assent, past consideration, variation of ongoing transaction, consideration, and
so on turn out to be voyages into those naria incognita charted only by the above dots. See also
note 17, supra.
27. See L. Friedman. Contract Law in America 15-26 (1965).
28. See Summers. Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts. 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969).
The major burden of this article, in fact, is to question whether this "emanicipation" of "labor
contract" from "contract" has not been overdone.
29. See N.Y. INs. L.. especially §§ 140-74.
30. See UN1t ORM COMMIRCIAL CODE (1962 Official Text) [hereinafter "U.C.C."] art. 2;
UNIFORM SALES AcT (1906), I & IA UNIFORMi LAws ANNOTATED (1958). And note that even
that most enthusiastic of generalists, Samuel Williston of Harvard, found it necessary to write
two treatises, one on contracts and the other on sales.
3 1. On the significance of transaction types, that is, repetitive dramatic situations at a factual
level more precise than "contract" or even "deal," see Llewellyn. The First Struggle to Unhorse
Sales, 52 HARV. L. REv. 873 (1939), Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract anid a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U.L. REv. 159, 160 n.2 (1938).
32. See notes 17 and 26, supra.
*19701
HeinOnline -- 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 139 1970
140 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
on one or more identification criteria and developed one' or more
additional high frequency internal correlation's, so that it was
recognized that a new something had come into existence. 3 At any
rate, what is most interesting for present purposes is that many long
years ago precisely such a reclassification movement took place with
respect to consumer transactions.
Contract as Contract of Adhesion
The movement of thought about consumer transactions seems to
have come about because of empirical pressure upon one particular
criterion for contractness-joint creative process. The following factual
situation was increasingly presented: A and B met to enter into a
transaction. They talked about the price and identity of the goods, and
maybe about a few other things. These terms they might indeed create
between themselves. But then one of the parties would submit to the
other a piece of paper covering several, perhaps many, other actually
or potentially important terms of the deal. The dickered and discussed
terms were added to that paper, and that paper then became "the terms
of the transaction."
Now notice that this type of transaction did not differ from the
previous horse-trade model in that once all terms were argued over,
while later on only a few were. In both kinds of deals, only some of
the terms were discussed. But in the horse-trade deal what was left out
was covered by statute, custom or legal implication; in the new pattern,
what was not discussed was covered by the proffered document. That
does not mean that under the pre-modern deal all the terms were
necessarily less onerous to the buyer. Some, indeeed, were beastly.:" But
the process of filling in and filling out a deal not by one party's will,
but by the legal and political process, tended to lessen the possibility
of monolithic one-sidedness; buyers were occasionally also powerful
classes (e.g., buyers of farm commodities), and what they won for
themselves tended to slip over into other trades too, to protect the
farmers, for instance, when they bought at retail. What the institution
of the retail-form-pad sale created was the possibility of special
33. Consider also, for instance, quasi-contract, at least in part a device for dealing with non-
donative, non-coercive but non-agreement transactions, that is, a mechanism for correcting
enrichment stemming from neither gift, force, fraud, or bargain.
34. See,. for instance, the common-law rule putting risk of "innocent" destruction of the goods
on the holder of the title, 2 S. WILLISTON. SALES § 301 (1948), despite the immense burden that
puts upon a buyer out of possession with respect to losses the causes or which are unclear.
UCC § 2-509 is more realistic and particularistic, though results rarely differ
[Vol. 19,
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governing rules for each transaction-type. The rules became custom-
made rather than customary.
Thus in any sector of commerce where, in the circumstances, one
party could impose most of its own terms, could unilaterally create
most of the rules of that game, there was nothing to prevent highly
disproportionate "contracts" from being created. These circumstances
were, of course, those which decreased single-transaction market power
more or less permanently and radically for one of the classes of usual
parties. What the specific circumstances creating that power to impose
terms, whether sanctioned monopoly, lawful or unlawful oligopoly,
lack of mobility and information, lack of interest (because each deal
was too trivial to think about, or the imposed terms covered
contingencies too hypothetical to engage attention) or what all else will
not concern us here. I will just take as a premise that there grew during
this century an increasing number of transaction types in which most
of the terms of the transaction were imposed by one of the parties on
the other, rather than created between them or left to customary
coverage.
5
Naturally, there were a number of responses to this state of affairs.
It would be an egregious error to suppose that those one-sided
contracting processes and the one-sided contracts which resulted, were
allowed to pass unnoticed and unmitigated by the law. The tight textual
regulation of insurance policies combined with enthusiastic contra
proferentem interpretation, for instance, was (and is) such a response
still in the course of development.3 Fraud and duress were stretched,
consideration doctrine was mangled.3 7 But there was (and is) an
35. Actually I have no empirical evidence that the frequency of this type of transaction has
increased over, say, the last fifty years or so. But most people seem to assume so, see, e.g.. L.
'VOLD. SALES 447 (2d ed. 1959). and it seems certainly reasonable (given the increase in marketer
concentration) to believe that it did. More important, there is no evidence that this move toward
standardized contracts has in the net decreased social welfare, at least in any reasonably
materialistic sense of the term. First, it is often the case that the form pad, as one-sided as it
may be. does not present a deal as awful as one the free-willed but weak-minded can get for
himself by dickering. In addition, it can unashamedly be argued that mass production has
increased everyone's welfare (as defined here) and that mass production needs mass distribution.
See Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. Riuv. 700, 701-02 (1939). But even assuming that all
that is true, and that this new marketing pattern is, finally, "better" than dicker-distribution, it
is so only "in the net" and "finally". Individual unpleasantness might (and does) still flow from
this statistical good, and if it could be mitigated without any doomed attempt to return to an
unrecoverable (and partially imaginary) past, and at bearable cost, that would be (and is) a
respectable legal job.
36. See. e.g.. Lachs v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E. 2d
555 (1954) on what you don't "know" even if the words are "there". See Wyatt v. Northwestern
Mut. Ins. Co. of Seattle, 304 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn. 1969) for a very recent garden-variety
example.
37. Set, UCC § 2-302. Comment I.
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enormous conceptual difficulty in dealing thoroughly and
systematically with the problem: since all contracts to some extent
involve terms created by only one party, how do you meddle with one-
sided contracts without destroying the basic rule that one is bound to
the terms of "his" contracts?
38
The conceptual move was to create a new category, once again by
exploiting linkable differences within a necessarily non-homogenous
class. The scholars, in a really dazzling series of discussions,'0 created
from the residuary category "contracts," the new subcategory
"'contracts of adhesion." Their basic insight was a simple and elegant
one: there is a critical difference between a bargaining process and an
on-off light switch. In the typical consumer-goods deal, for instance,
the consumer must take the whole deal (or most of it) as a deal, or
leave it, all of it. Assuming that the seller is not a true or effective
monopolist and the goods or services are not vital to life, the consumer
does, in theory, have an option: he can flip the switch either way. But
he is not presented with any rheostatic alternative which would permit
him to vary the quality of the deal between the on-off poles. Surely,
argued the commentators, there is a difference important enough
between the dickered deal and the adhesion deal to justify a new
category-contracts of adhesion-to be treated by the courts
differently than plain old residuary-category contracts.
As an analytic device this new category was a brilliant coup. As a
practical matter it has been, I think, a disaster. Fifty years after the
first extended development of the adhesion doctrine," and twenty-five
years after its most elegant and powerful discussion," the consumer-
purchase transaction is still stumbling about, a diagnosed disease
seeking a nostrum. Various patent remedies are still being applied like
mustard plasters-public policy, 2  fundamental breach, 3
38. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
39. See lsaacs, The Standardization of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); L. PRAUSNITZ. TIHL
STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS-IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937).
reviewed by Llewellyn, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700 (1939); Kessler, supra note 16; Ehrenzweig,
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953); Sales, Standard
Forn Contracts, 16 MODERN L. REV. 318 (1953); Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the
Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL.
L. REV. 481 (1962); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundantental Breach, 50
VA. L. REV. 1178 (1964): Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L &
COmP. L.Q. 172 (1965).
40. Isaacs, supra note 39.
41. Kessler, supra note 16.
42. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
43. See Meyer. supra note 39.
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unconscionability44-and like such plasters, they seem to irritate more
than they cure. There is presently no powerful legal theory successfully
grappling with one-sided consumer deals.
45
Why? Because, among other things, the phrase "contract of
adhesion" fails to rivet the reformers' (and judges') attention on what
is really at issue. In fact, "adhesion contract" turns out upon
examination to be one of those magical language-game products like
"darkness visible" or "incorporeal body," by the use of which one
"describes" non-states of affairs (the principal historical use of which
has been, interestingly enough, for descriptions of the theologically
ineffable).
The intellectual process which led to "contract of adhesion" is, at
least with hindsight, and in terms of my earlier classification
discussion, relatively easy to describe. Prior to creation of the adhesion-
contract category, "the law" had been guilty of a common
misclassification technique. Seeing that consumer transactions were
communicative (rather than, say, physically coercive), mercantile
(rather than charitable or donative), and bounded (rather than status-
relational), and so on,46 "the law" continued to class them as
contractual. This overlooked the fact that these "contracts" were not
the product of a cooperative process, but the creation (essentially) of
only one of the parties. In other words, "the law" was classing
consumer transactions as contracts on the basis of less than all the
criteria which actually shaped that particular class. The adhesion
contract theorists corrected that particular error. They detected the
non-process nature of some "contracts" (including consumer
transactions) and thus created, so they thought, a new category,
roughly speaking "that which would be a contract except that no
bargaining process really shapes it." For describing such a beast the
phrase "contract of adhesion" is not half bad. Its picture, such as it
is, is one not of haggle or cooperative process but rather of a fly and
flypaper. 47 Thus the phrase focussed on the fact that whatever
44. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
45. There are those who argue that the unconscionability doctrine, UCC § 2-302, is just such
a theory. See. e.g.. Spanogle. Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931
(1969): Ellinghaus, In Dejense of Unconscionability. 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969). See Murray,
Unconscionabilitv': Unconscionabilitr. 31 U. PITT. L. REV. (1970) for a particularly
evangelistic argument. (As of the writing of this, this last article had not been published, but
Professor Murray was kind enough to permit a final manuscript copy to be shown to me.)
46. See "Contract as Contract," TAN 15-33,supra.
47. See Left, Unconscionabilit'r and tMe Code -The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485. 504 n.67 (1967) for the probable etiology of the term "contract of adhesion."
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protection against overreaching and unfairness a process of cooperative
creation might be supposed to give, an adhered-to document gave no
such protection. Assuming that contract law is in some complex way
tied up with belief in the good-maximizing powers of the market, itself
based on the assumption that people know better what is of value to
them than any state or other guardian, unbargainable deals were
critically different from dickered deals.
But that insight got the commentators only half way. Once they had
isolated the fact that there was no contracting-process protection in
adhesion deals, their metaphor was exhausted. For if their new legal
griffin was not an ordinary barnyard type of animal, it was still some
kind of "contract," that is, an undertaken obligation which the law
would ordinarily enforce. It might be an exotic animal indeed, but it
was still an animal-to be fed, watered, and treated more or less like
a cow. But when enforce these adhesion contracts? Certainly the phrase
"contract of adhesion" doesn't push the answer "never" briskly
forward. And the economics of the mass distribution of goods make
that a commercially absurd answer anyway.' 8 Certainly not "always;"
the whole purpose of the addition of "of adhesion" was to negative
that possibility (and in effect reserve it for plain old unmodified
"contract"). But if clearly not "never" or "always", then when? The
new metaphor gave (and gives) not the slightest color of any answer
to that question. The new metaphoric category, since carved from the
older category of "contract," and left with all the smell of freedom-
of-contract enforceability clinging to it, was naked of any substantive
criteria for evaluating the central problem: what is a "bad" contract?
Contract As Thing
There was (and is) however, a ready-made new category for adhesion
deals (including consumer-goods deals) which stayed overlooked,
despite the fact that it fits better than "adhesion contract", the
identification criteria of this new class of deals. Consider this phony
historical paradigm." Let us say that once upon a time all goods were
custom made in the presence, and sometimes with the assistance, of the
intended purchaser, who oversaw every detail. When the goods were not
satisfactory, and the buyer complained to the authorities, he was
48. See note 35, supra.
49. Freud's primal-horde myth, Freud, Totent and Taboo in 13 THE STANDARD EDITION O
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD I. 141-46 (J. Strachy tr. 1955), is
my stylistic source for expression via non-historical historical parables.
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regularly met with the answer that if he didn't like the way the thing
was being done he should have said something then. Occasionally,
when the craftsman was granted a royal patent of monopoly, or even
when he achieved it "naturally," the rule would be relaxed. But in
general the buyer was held to what he had helped to create or acceded
to knowingly. Then a new method of production grew up. Men made
things in closed factories and brought them to market. Their innards
and construction were completed when the buyer came upon them. The
goods proliferated and no man could be expert as to all of them. In
such a situation the old "rule': would begin to look silly, and one could
foresee (after some fencing over disclosure levels and the varieties of
fraud and quasi-fraud) the creation of two legal categories, plain old
goods (maybe now called "custom made goods") and "goods of
adhesion." The focus of legal attention would nonetheless remain upon
the nature and quality of the goods and certain rules would become
natural candidates for adoption: "no junk," or "fair average quality,"
or "no hidden defects." The criteria of "goodness" could not possibly
be rigid, but quality and access to knowledge about it would be the
subject of the inquiry.""
Now consider one particular modern consumer transaction, the
purchase of that most ubiquitous consumer good (or consumer
"better" or consumer "best" perhaps, considering the advertising
framework), the automobile1 Start with the scenario; we'll look more
closely at the props in a moment.
The curtain rises on a typical new automobile showroom, this one
for products of Tyrannosaurus Motors. There are the usual tacky little
salesmen's tables ranged against the rear wall, the usual banners on the
walls ("Tyrannosaurus is Rex; "Put a carnivore in your garden"),
the ubiquitous colored brochures on every flat surface. Downstage left
is a rumpled middle-aged man (call him "Mark") devotedly circling a
huge car, occasionally giving it a cautious pat or gentle rub, emanating
the taut glow of a man uncertain at what point courting might be
treated as indecent liberties. Downstage center is a neatly dressed man
of roughly the same age with a carefully trimmed 'nustache. He is
trying, though not very hard, to appear as if he is staring out into
space, but he knows, and Mark knows, and we know, that he is
50. See B. NICHOLAS. AN INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LAW 181-82 (1962) for an early actually
historical instance of such a focus.
51. Insofar as the automobile purchase is atypical, involving as it does an expensive chattel
over which consumers do'take some care, it cuts against the points I am trying to make. That is
why I chose it.
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following the scene with the eyes of a'father with seven daughters and
a shotgun watching the parlor couch from the upstairs landing. Mark
opens and slams the car door once more, kicks the left front tire Jbndly
but firmly, and sighs piteously. The other man immediately
approaches:




S: 385 HP. Big horses.
M: Expensive.
S: Not for what you're getting. (There follows at this point, as a
cadenza, a more or less detailed description, mostly in terminology that
would make an analyst blush, of the delights of possession and use. This
culminates with. .. .
M: How much?
S: (clipped) $4,782.37.) At this point, the tone of both takes on a kind
of chanting, ceremonial air, the performance of a ritual investiture
between coreligionists.)
M: From happy Harry I can get it for $4,600, plus $300 for my '62
Pteradactyl.
S: $4,300 net? You're talking cash?
M: Twenty-four months I'm talking.
S: (Suppressing what is either a smile, or the yawn of a predator, and
pointing toward one of the "desks" upstage) Come, let's talk. (They sit
down together and one can hear only a low confused murmur, with
occasional single words and phrases standing out, like "dual exhausts,"
"superchargers", "whitewalls", "genuine leatherette" and "roof
frescoes." At last.)
S: OK, that'll come to $4,782.37 plus financing. You want it? (Or in
Latin, spondesne.)
M: OK. When can I pick it up? (I.e., spondeo.)
S: For midnight puce, you'll have to wait till next Friday. Now, if
you'll just sign these papers ....
M: (Signs)
Now notice, there has been a lot of bargaining, usually much, much
more than my truncated script indicates. But it has been over two
things, price and standard variations in the product. In fact, there is
only one element of the deal that has not been the subject of any
contracting process: the contract. And what does that look like? It
looks like a contract. But when one stands far enough back from the
whole deal, from the whole process of goods buying, what one sees is
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a unitary, purchased bundle, of which the product, say a car, is just
the most tangible (and, oddly enough, the most mutable) thing. One
goes out and acquires the whole "set" which is a "deal- on a car," and
of the interchangeable subsets (object, extras, contract), it is in fact
arguable that the contract is more of a "thing" than the goods which
are sold pursuant to it.
Why then do people continue to call a certain thing a contract
instead of a thing? What impels one to classify an X among the
preexisting category "contracts," especially since so many of the
family resemblances among contracts center on the physiogomy of
bargain, agreement, dicker, process, mutability, becoming.12 If that is
so, why would people, very well aware of the non-bargained genesis of
a consumer contract call it a contract? After all, the key insight about
"contracts of adhesion" was that they were products of non-
bargaining, unilaterally manufactured commodities.53 Because as a
thing, an object, it looks like the referent of the noun form of the word
"contract;" it looks the way the product of the process of bargaining
so often looks. What happened, it seems to me, is that of all the indicia
which determine whether a thing is a contract or not, the most
irrelevant-the physical appearance of the thing as a thing-turned out
to be the most powerful. This thing, the consumer contract, just
happens to look like the result of what in the consumer-contract
context is a nonhappening,s4 the consumer contracting process 5
Practicalities
What, if anything, might be the practical consequence of shifting the
metaphoric framework within which consumer-transaction law
develops from "contract" (of adhesion) to "thing" ("product")?
Assuming for the moment the accuracy of my critical distinction
between the classes "contract" and "thing", that a thing presents itself
52. See "Contract as Contract," TAN 15-33, supra.
53. Or, to be more accurate perhaps, contracting is to adhering what J. Press' custom suits
are to its rack suits. Neither are either perfectly fixed or perfectly alterable, but the distinction is
plain-and the necessary price differential is even plainer.
54. It is even more ironic, perhaps, that even to the. extent that there is a happening leading to
the consumer contract, it is in any event to a large extent shielded from effective judicial scrutiny
by the vestigial parol evidence rule.
55. See [text after note 14], supra. In short, while everyone knows that not all contracts are
writings, it was not fully appreicated how important it was in this context to recognize that not
all writings were contracts either, even if commercial, bounded, future-regulating, etc. Or still
another way to put it is that not every pair of identification criteria are, in fact, necessarily related
to each other with any overwhelming correlation, even though each one singly may correlate
highly with the classification itself.
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as what it is, to take or leave, while contract implies the final phase of
a process, it should not be a real jaw-dropper to suggest that regulatory
and remedial strategies might vary depending upon whether one
thought one was regulating process or product. There are, it seems to
me, only three general strategies for regulating consumer transactions;
you can focus your attention on the parties, the dealing, or the product.
For current purposes,56 the critical strategic decision seems to be
between deal control and goods control. (Let me interject here, lest you
all think me mad, that I am aware that it is not writ large in the
heavens that one cannot mix techniques.) Now, keeping in mind the
nature, factual and legal, of the usual consumer-goods (or services)
transaction, deal control is ordinarily a stupid option; it is silly to seek
to shape and control the contours of a process that does not take place.
That does not mean that fraud, duress (both classical and "business
duress57) or even "procedural unconscionability"5' are totally irrelevant
to the consumer-goods field. It's just that such approaches are beside
the point most of the time; it's like bandaging a cut on a broken leg.
The normal, non-pathological consumer sale,5 is one in which a form
is proferred by a non-monopolist selling non-life-essential goods
pursuant to no huge quantum of lying, and in which that form is signed
because no one is particularly interested in the sub-set of the whole
package which is the contract. In such a context, how does one go
about regulating the contract as a process. By facilitating more
bargaining? But that is absurd (I) because, as Llewellyn saw as early
as anybody,'" the mass produced contract is complementary to, and has
the same economic utility of, the mass-produced product; (2) most
"'objectionable" clauses of a consumer contract have only contingent,
often highly contingent, importance, and no buyer not represented by
a lawyer (whose job it is almost wholly to think about things which
are not going to happen) is going to think much about them;" and (3)
56. It is conceivable that one could regulate consumer transactions by "regulating" the parties.
for instance putting consumers under some kind of tiitelary disenablement, or licensing merchants
for honesty and competence. But for a host of reasons which I will not enlarge upon here. I do
not consider person regulation a viable approach to consumer-contract regulation.
57. See Dawson, Econ6mic Duress-An Essay in Perspective. 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1947).
58. See Leff, supra note 47, at 489-508.
59. There is certainly enough law to deal with lying and coercing. But unless one expands lying
to include "'inculcating desire by appealing to man's worst instincts through advertising." and
subsumes form-padding under duress, most transactions are not, in that sense, pathological.
60. Llewellyn, supra note 35, at 701-02.
61. Contrast the law's treatment of penalties with its avowed policy not to take account of
adequacy of consideration. Part of the source of that disparate treatment is that consideration is
what iwill happen: penalty is treated by the parties much more lightly, as what most likely (or at
least hopefully) will not. See5 CORBIN. CONTRACTS § 1057 (1964).
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even if the unrepresented consumer were interested, it is unlikely that
he would have the necessary sophistication for such consideration. (One
should not forget that even when a contract is hammered out mit sturm
und drang by large law firms o'n behalf of industrial and financial
giants, both principals "adhere" to most of the resulting document.) I
would argue that so long as one is bemused by the word "contract,"
even when it is intelligently modified by the cognomen "adhesion," it
is likely that one will sometimes seek to impress his controls on a
process which does not exist. This type of misfocus is already patent.
It may be seen, for instance, in § 2-302 of the UCC12 and its
issue § 5.107 of the UCCC,13 both dealing with unconscionability; in
UCC § 2-20711 (on the battle of the forms); and in the continuing line
of feeling that a large or conspicuous piece of writing (as contrasted
with meaning) is sufficient, within a bargaining universe, to be the
subject of that bargaining.1
5
What would happen, however, if one pushed the straddle that
"contract of adhesion" represents off the wall in the other direction
and made a quantum leap to the other regulatory focus, product
control? What would happen, that is, if one did actually think about
consumer contracts as things?
First of all, that would open up the law's long tradition, accelerating
of late, of direct, explicit governmental control of the quality and safety
or products. Autos now have mandatory seatbelts, "6 milk is bereft of
its tubercles,67 and outright poisonous substances are barred from the
marketplace." Even less reified "things", when seen as products, have
been regulated as to quality for quite a long time. Life insurance
contracts," for instance, have been in effect written by deputy insurance
62. UCC § 2-302.
63. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 (1969 Revised Final Draft) [hereinafter cited
as UCCC].
64. See Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Research (Part II), 20 J. LEG. ED. 460, 465
(1968).
65. See, e.g., how the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE defines "conspicuous" as "so written that
a reasonable person ...ought to have noticed it .... Language ...is 'conspicuous' if it is
in larger or other contrasting type or color." UCC § 1-201 (10) (emphasis added).
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 for automobile and tire safety standards.
67. See STATE OF NEW YORK. OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES. -RULES AND REGULATIONS.
tit. 10, ch. I. part 3 (N.Y.S. Dep't. of Health, Sanitary Code, Milk and Milk Products).
68. In fact, it is even possible to ban a drug which, while it won't kill you, is unlikely to help
you much either. See 21 U.S.C. § 355.
69. I do not wish to press this point too hard. but it seems to me very likely that along with
the economic and social forces which have shaped the techniques for controlling iinsurance
agreements, there has also functioned the fact that an insurance contract is a "policy," that is,
that the most common label does not bring one up against the magically misleading word
"contract" at all.
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commissioners for years.70 Nor has this quality-control device always
required legislative action. The initial peculiar treatment of injurious
foods in sealed packages7' has almost ripened into the general
"dangerous instrumentality" rule of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.72 And even contract law, even traditional contract lore, is not
wholly crippled as a mechanism for reific thinking. There is the frame-
of-reference of "illegality" and its cousin, "against public policy," as
a basis for decisions that some contract terms, no matter how they got
into the contract, are too lousy to enforce. 73 When the static of
Henningsen74 subsides, for instance, one can hear the clear whinney of
the unruly horse.75 But "public policy" is so powerful a cure that wise
physicians shun it. And illegality is a pretty slender reed, mostly
because of the historical restrictions built into it. Generally, though
with exceptions, the "harm" of the provision must be more substantial
than getting a lousy deal, and it must be visited upon either some
discernible person other than the parties, and maybe on the public
generally. 76 In any event, the baggage that one totes along with
"illegality" is-presently too heavy for modern travel, and it is a deal-
killing, not a deal-shaping technique anyway.
Not that I am suggesting for a moment that one must view a
contract as a thing in order to regulate its content. In a few places that
is openly done in the UCC, 77 and it is done much more frequently in
the UCCC, which has two whole parts devoted to "illegal"
provisions, 78 and even a few sections devoted to stipulating precise and
mandatory language. 7  But I am, willing to argue that viewing a
contract as a product facilitates such a strategy, and, much more
important, makes it necessary for the draftsman actually to think
about what he is trying to do.80
70. See N.Y. INS. L. § 154 (approval of life, accident, health and annuity contracts): see
also § 155 with its five pages of standard provisions.
71. See I S. WILLISTON. SALES §§ 241-42 (1948).
72. RLSTATE\LIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
73. See 6A A. CORaIN. CONTRACTS § 1375 (1962).
74. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.358. 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
75. See 32 N.J. at 403-08. 161 A.2d at 94-97.
76. 6A A. CORBIN. CONTRACTS (1962) is wholly devoted to the ins and outs of this powerful.
arcane and peculiarly limited concept.
77. See UCC §§ 2-318, 2-725(l). 9-318(4).
78. UCCC art. 2. pt. 4, and art. 3. pt. 4 (§§ 2.401-2.416, and 3.401-3.409. respectively).
79. See, e.g.. UCCC § 2.503(2).
80. Unlike the situation with respect to § 2-302 of the UCC. as I have previously and
stridently argued. See Leff, supra note 47. especially at 557-59.
See -Conclusion," TAN 103-04 infra for limitations upon this direct quality-control technique.
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But talking about contracts as things, as "part of" the goods being
sold, opens up another regulatory road. The pervasive weapon of the
common law for controlling the quality of goods, at least to the extent
of giving redress when the goods were abnormally shoddy or
dangerous, has not been statutory or regulatory specification, but
warranty. If nothing is said at the sale, said the law, the goods must
be of fair average quality (which, I assume, turned out, most of the
time, to be "minimum bearable quality") within the trade. Notice the
delicious involutions of that development. Warranty law is at least
initially contract law; much of its seamier history, for instance privity
and disclaimer doctrine, comes out of that particular displacement of
metaphor."' But out of that naissance came the word (and the field)
"warranty". If something was said about the quality of the goods, that
"contract" governed. But if nothing was said, what was said? That
there were no huge surprises in store for anyone who bought this
particular member of that general class of goods. In other words, that
the goods were more or less what they purported to be.8"
It is with respect to this mysterious "purporting" which things can
apparently manage that there arises, it seems to me, a critical change
in how one views a consumer-sale document qua thing rather than qua
contract. The transformation is quite subtle, so subtle in fact that it
may not exist. But this is what I have in mind: there is a fantasy deeply
imbedded in the rites of linguistic use (of which contract interpretation
is a branch) that words convey the information which they "'mean" :"
If you can see and read a sentence, you have possession of the message.
That does not mean that the law has made no provision for
communication breakdown. At every stage of the communication
process- sending set, medium, receiving set-critical malfunctions
have been recognized. There are fine-print cases,84 back-of-the-form
cases,"5 foreign language cases," illiteracy cases, 87 mental incompetence
81. Of course, it depends on how one places one's "initially". If one picks a very early
"'initially," it was first tort, then contract, and now, maybe, tort again. See I S. WILLISTON.
SALES §§ 195-96 (1948).
82. The current statutory embodiment of warranty comprises UCC §§ 2-312-2-318. The
statutory story told there is more complicated than, but not at odds with, my shorthand summary.
83. I say this in the face of the powerful, well known, and extensive efforts to correct this
simplistic notion. See, e.g.. 3 A. CORBIN. CONTRACTS §§ 532-60 (1960); Farnsworth,
"Aeaning" in the Law of Contracts. 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967).
84. See Vogel & Berstein, Fine Print. 21 Bus. LAW 544 (1966); Note, 63 HARV. L. Riv. 494
(1950).
85. See. e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
86. See, e.g., Fricke v. lsbrandtson Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct., Nassau County,
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (Spanish-
speaking consumer and salesman, English contract).
87. See, e.g.. Dysarz v. Janczarek, 238 Mich. 529, 213 N.W. 694 (1927); Caton v.
Wellershouse, 77 Pa. Super. 331 (1921).
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cases,88 drunkenness cases"' and so on. But these cases are all seen and
felt as somehow exceptional, to be understood against the background
rule: if words become available to a consciousness capable of receiving
them as words, then the meaning of those words is deemed also to have
been conveyed. And "meaning", in such a formulation, refers to what
they eventually unambiguously say 0 This, of course, is quite a natural
way to regard words; it is, in fact, hard to think about them any other
way.
When things "purport" however, the communication process is
"seen" quite differently. Things are not usually regarded as bearers of
messages (the way hemoglobin "carries" oxygen compounds), but
rather as messages themselves. They are, are amenable to the senses,
and what they convey to the senses is what they are. Thus, for instance,
judges thinking warranty did not always assume that just because a
product was "there" it disclosed everything about itself that one would
like to know.' Not only are parts of things inaccessible to all the
senses, but not even everything about things "in the open" is disclosed
to sight-or to the touch, smell, hearing and taste. There are, in fact,
things about things which are opaque to 'the senses under all
circumstances. There are other things which are opaque except under
special sense-increasing circumstances. 2 But critically, what the judges
realized was that the actual circumstances of the examination,
including the situation, expeerience and knowledge of the buyer,
determined what in fact the object, the product, "said" about itself.
When the subject was a thing, rather than a contract, the question
became what a reasonable (this?) purchaser knew or ought to have
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C (Tent. Draft No.I. 1964) and cases
cited in Comments b-f.
89. See id.. § 18D and cases cited in Comments b & c.
See also, for a somewhat broader view, UCC § 6.11 l(3)(e), which describes as one of the
factors to be taken into account by the administrator in determining whether to seek an injunction
against a pattern of seller activity as "unconscionable," whether the "respondent has knowingly
taken advantage of the inability of the debtor reasonably to protect his interests by reason of
physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the
agreement, or similar factors."
90. But see note 83, supra.
91. See, e.g.. Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918) (cited in 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES. Torts § 28.20 at 1581 n.13 (1956)) for a clear statement of how even looking, if
not correctly motivated, will not "disclose" certain important facts about a thing.
92. For instance,'metal fatigue, needing X-ray examination for discovery.
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known under the actual circumstances. There was no pretence that
objects were, just by being "seeable," omnidisclosive. This concept,
often warily circled by the latent-patent defect terminology," seems to
have made it possible for the judges to focus somewhat more precisely
on the actual position of the particular "receiving set" for the message,
rather than merely lopping out crude chunks of competence like
"insane," "illiterate" and "drunk". 4
The differing impulse of the courts when approaching "contract",
however, seems to have led to a different implicit "rule": subject to
(a) gross defects in transmission of the words as words (small type,
back of form, foreign language); and (b) the gross defects in the
"receiving set" set out above (insanity, minority, sometimes illiteracy),
a contract means that which it finally unambiguously means upon
examination. But that view of meaning conveyance, of words as
affective happenings, makes sense, if at all, only when the words are
viewed as either the result of, or at least the basis for, a process of
coming about. If, however, a particular contract is a mass-produced
inalterable thing, then the words that make it up are just elements of
the thing, like wheels and carburetors. They do not have, at least not
common to the parties, any history or any future.
Perhaps another way to put this groping distinction is to say that a
proposal for or product of a discussion is different from a label. If a
label doesn't actually convey its message on the spot, in the actual
conditions where it is to function, then it does no good at all. Certainly
if a rule of law demanded a warning on a product it would give pause
to a judge if the bottle said "Respiratory Depressant" rather than
"Poison, "" or bore the Christian Omega of death rather than the
Skull-and-Cross-Bones. And this unease would be hardly.alleviated by
the prominence or size of the type face. Certainly also, in a warranty
case, if the manufacturer's defense against an electrocuted buyer's
claim was that there was a wiring diagram on the front of the product
which "clearly" showed the uninsulated power input snuggling against
the metal door frame, the -bookmaker's book would be heavy against
the manufacturer.16 And the odds would seem almost equally good if
93. See 77 C.J.S. Sales § 315 at pp. 1158-59 (1952).
94. See RISTAT-'11-NT (SICOND) OI- CONTRACTS §§ 18-18D (Tent. Draft No.1, 1964). See also
note 56. supra.
95. For a very recent negligence case in which a warning label which in fact did verbally warn
of possible death from use of the product was nevertheless (quite rightly) held to be insufficiently
scarifying under the circumstances, see Griffin v. Planters Chemical Corp.. 302 F. Supp. 937
(D.S.C. 1969).
96. CJ: Holmes, The Path of the Law. 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897): "The prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
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pasted to the front of the door were the label "Voltage through door:
220." Only when the label said something like "DANGER-Wiring
Fault-Do Not Plug In Until Corrected By Electrician" would one
start betting on the defendant.
If indeed there is some such distinction in legal approach to
"contract" messages and "thing" messages, 7 that would tend to
explain, at least in part, certain otherwise extraordinary regulatory
decisions to allow words which do "say" a warning to be a warning
without regard to commercial realities, so long as the word delivery is
sufficient. There leaps to mind the warranty-disclaimer section of the
UCC, 98 pursuant to which "there are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof' will exclude all warranties
of fitness, and pursuant to which, presumably, "There is no warranty
of merchantability" will exclude that one-so long as the words are in
writing and conspicuous (which means "in larger or other contrasting
type or color"). 9 Or look at the effect of the subliminal smell of
contracting process in the most recent piece of consumer-protection
drafting, the UCCC. One section provides""' in its material part as
follows:
(I) In addition to contracting for a security interest in the goods sold, a
seller of goods in a consumer credit sale may secure the debt arising from
the sale by (a) contracting for a security interest in goods previously sold
to the buyer by the seller if there is an existing security interest in the
goods held by the seller;. . . . (emphasis supplied)
Now, this is the provision that is apparently designed to deal with
the Williams v. Walker-Thomas"' type of problem. How does it deal
with it? Well, it seems to contemplate a little negotiating session
between openminded dealers like the Walker-Thomas folks, and young
sophisticates like Mrs. Williams, and, Heaven help us, over a contract
provision in the permissible, and therefore presumable, form:
From and after the date hereof, Seller shall have a security interest in all
goods heretofore sold to buyer to secure payment for said goods and for
the goods sold to the buyer hereunder.
97. Even to approach proving such a distinction one would have to have examined and
described with fantastic insight and precision a vast body of decided cases--latent-patent cases,
contract interpretation cases, fine print cases, and so on. I have not done so,
98. UCC § 2-316.
99. UCC § 1-201(10).
100. UCC § 2.408.
101. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Fantasyville. 0 2
If, on the other hand, one is not thinking "contract" or
"agreement" at all, it seems more likely that one will demand
something on the order of a warning label. If cross-collateral clauses
are to be permitted at all, they should be treated as a latent danger and
labelled as such. With one's mind tuned that way, while one might
continue to demand. "conspicuousness" for the words, one would also
require conspicious meaning, e.g.,
Caution. If you don't pay on time for what you just bought, we may be
able to take back everything we ever sold you.
Conclusion
The approach I have been touting is to think about the paper-with-
words which accompanies the sale of a product as part of that product.
This classifactory shift may perhaps have two effects. First, it would
provide a better conceptual framework for direct governmental quality
controls. When things are too dangerous or too worthless the
government does directly intervene. There is no reason why that
intervention should not take place as directly with respect to contracty
things.
But the limitations of any quality-control approach must be
considered, however briefly. Even if one does approach a contract as a
thing, it is not so terribly easy to tell when even things should be
regulated. One does not solve the evil-defining problem merely by
approaching it as a species of goods-quality control. Bluntly, what
kinds of clauses ought to be illegal? Certainly the answer is not "harsh
ones". Almost all deal breakdowns are going to have harsh effects on
one of the parties, and it is certainly not clear that ball harshness
should be absorbed by the party able to spread the impact over all
purchasers. It is not irrefutably clear that stable contract makers ought
necessarily pick up the tab for those whose contracts break up. For
among other things, this quality-control technique has important
economic (and, therefore, social) costs. If carried forward with any
vigor, no lawful contract could descend in "fairness" or "safety"
below a certain qualitative minimum. In certain situations that would
have the same effect as some building codes: the cheapest one can get
is more expensive than one can afford.1"3 One is less able to trade off
102. In fairness to the draftsmen of the UCC, it must be pointed out that they have eliminated,
in § 2.409, the most vicious aspects of cross-collateral clauses. But note that they have done so
by direct quality-control of the contract, not by playing with the "contracting" process.
103. Consider also, as another instance, the proposals that wage-garnishment be totally
19701
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quality or risk .for price even if one wants to and is aware of what one
is doing. In brief, the government-quality-control technique is a
replacement for market-set quality and price levels and mixes. Whether
the fundamental market-economy postulate, that individuals most
often know what they want better than a government does, is
empirically sound or not, there is certainly evidence that governments
tend frequently to make an unacknowledged conflation of the two
wildly different concepts "what they want" and "what is good for
them," with numerous repressive effects. 04 Strict quality control is,
after all, a regulatory approach the basis of which is "I don't care if
you want it; you can't have it." This is highly justified when what you
want is a poison, when a slip in making your own decision as to what
is "good for you" is fatal. It may be justified for lesser risks when the
market is, in fact, highly imperfect. As the price of an error becomes
more and more merely economic (rather than organic), and the market
becomes more subject to normal competitive correctives, this intrusion
becomes more and more noxious. While this new metaphor may thus
suggest a newly applicable frame of reference-governmental goods-
quality control-it does not without more make any of the hard
decisions about when and how to use it.10
5
Hence attempts not directly to regulate quality, but instead to
increase the availability and quality of the information upon which
buying (market) decisions are based, have good sense behind them. I
have tried to indicate that the metaphoric shift here proposed has a
subtle but important effect upon the workings of that regulatory device
forbidden, e.g.. Kerr, Wage Ganishment Should Be Prohibited. 2 PROSP oTus 371 (1969), i.e..
to turn all wages into spendthrift trusts.
104. See. e.g.. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4742(a) and 7238 on marihuana.
105. Even after identifying the "'unfair." in other words, there still remains the difficulty of
describing and producing the fair. and this general problem is certainly not limited to the
consumer-protection field. See H. WELLINGTON. LABOR AND TIl LLGAL PRocn ss 27-35
(Paperback ed. 1968) for a discussion in the context of labor policy.
Some experience with true goods-quality control is. however, suggestive. When the government
mandates the quality of goods, the practice seems most effective and least objectionable when the
threat is of a harm both serious and irreversible, like death or crippling from an ill-conceived
drug. See notes 66-68, supra. In the consumer-contract area, the harms are never quite that
dramatic, generally being limited to no more than the value of the bargain, but it may be
intelligent to focus one's regulatory efforts in this context on losses beyond the value of the
bargain (for instance, disclaimers of warranty affecting personal-injury claims, or contractual
collection devices which cost the debtor much more than the debt). It is indeed possible that the
courts, attempting to give content to UCC § 2-302. have adopted such aIn approach without
being aware of any general principle informing their thus far ad hoc approach. See Murray. supra
note 45, for a burgeoning but not quite expressed awareness of the significance of beyond-the-
bargain clauses when adhesion contracts run against the unconscionability clause. I hope to
expand a little on the idea in an article scheduled to appear in 31 U. PITT. L. Ri:v.. number 3.
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too. Briefly, I have argued that viewing a consumer contract as a thing
might in time lead to a perception of disclosure not in the old contract-
interpretation terminology but in a more realistic context, more
attuned to what happens at retail, to the ultimate production of more
actual information disclosure. Certainly such a shift would not solve
all the problems either. Many people don't read contracts at all; even
a clear one won't help them. And some people would sign a contract
even if "THIS IS A SWINDLE" were embossed across its top in
electric pink. But assuming that the new metaphor would produce fuller
message disclosure, at relatively small information cost, it might well
increase the power of the market itself to control the price-quality mix.
And there is one last limitation upon the utility of this suggested
metaphoric transformation which must finally be mentioned. While my
suggestion has been wholly serious, I am quite aware of the fragility
of this kind of effort. Language has never been much of a match for
sense perceptions except as an analytic, and analytics have a way of
being quickly swallowed up in the resurgant real world of synthetics.
One of Hohfeld's great contributions to legal analysis, for instance,
was the suggestion that some things, like "property," were not really,
at law, "things"' at all, but force fields. Intelligent discourse, he
argued, should not be directed towards deciding to whom a thing
belonged, because there was no thing to belong; there was only a bundle
of forces demanding, for sensible talk, a sort of vector analysis with
time coordinates.'"' With some historical distance, one can see that the
partial but undeniable failure of that powerful suggestion to take hold
was not primarily a product of Hohfeld's untimely death, or of some
basic vice in his analysis, but more of the fact that a farm, for instance,
bundle of powers, privileges, rights, etc. or not, persists in the
consciousness as "dirt with boundaries". In like manner, a consumer
contract of adhesion looks like a classic bargained contract. A
consumer contract is not a thing, at least not the way cars, cows and
couches are things, and no rhetoric is going to convince anyone for
long that it is. Thus the real hope of an exercise like this is necessarily
more modest than any total sensory transformation. It can aspire at
most temporarily to smash the semantic box in which our current
thinking is locked. The next step, and the harder one, is crafting a
better cabinet out of materials really available in a real world.
106. See, e.g., Hohfeld, Faulty Analrsis in Easement and License Cases. 27 YALE L.J. 66
(1917), applying Hohfeld. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning I & 11. 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) and 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
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